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Abstract:	
This	 article	 explores	 the	 implications	 of	 framing	 an	 event	 as	 a	 ‘crisis’	 through	 the	 case	 study	 of	 the	
Ebola	 epidemic	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 based	 on	 extensive	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 during	 and	 after	 the	
outbreak.	It	traces	how	Ebola	came	to	be	declared	an	emergency,	and	the	processes,	which	led	to	its	
definition	as	a	‘threat	to	international	peace	and	security’.	Secondly,	it	highlights	the	consequences	of	
this	 framing,	as	particular	 interpretations	of	 the	 roots	of	 the	emergency	drew	a	 line	between	 ‘good’	
citizens	 willing	 to	 adapt	 and	 ‘dangerous’	 ones	 needing	 to	 be	 contained.	 Finally,	 it	 turns	 to	 an	
ethnographic	 portrait	 of	 a	 traditional	 healer’s	 attempts	 to	 navigate	 the	 crisis	 by	 appropriating	 the	
knowledge	produced	by	the	response	apparatus.	Considering	how	those	at	the	receiving	end	of	policy	
discourses	strategically	reposition	themselves	in	relation	to	the	narratives	that	frame	them,	can	help	us	
question	the	reductive	dichotomy	between	adaptation	to	and	resistance	against	interventions.	
Keywords:	
Ebola;	Sierra	Leone;	emergency;	knowledge	production.		
	
	
																																								 																				
1	This	paper	is	based	on	the	Project	States	of	Emergency:	Citizenship	in	Crisis	in	Sierra	Leone,	funded	by	the	
Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	(ES/N01717X/1).	Some	of	the	ethnographic	material	also	draws	on	
research	carried	out	for	EBOVAC	Salone,	which	received	funding	from	the	Innovative	Medicines	Initiative	2	Joint	
Undertaking	under	grant	agreement	No	115854	
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1 Introduction	
In	March	2014,	the	first	official	cases	of	Ebola	Virus	Disease	were	recorded	in	Guinea.	By	August	of	that	
year,	the	World	Health	Organisation	(WHO)	had	announced	a	Public	Health	Emergency	of	International	
Concern	(PHEIC)	as	the	epidemic	reached	hundreds	of	cases	a	week	in	Liberia,	Guinea	and	Sierra	Leone.	
By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 epidemic	 in	March	 2016,	 over	 38,0000	 people	 had	 been	 affected	 by	 the	 disease,	
11,310	 died	 and	 countless	 suffered	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 significant	 socio-economic	 setbacks	 associated	
with	the	epidemic	(WHO,	2016).	The	conclusion	of	a	tortuous	two-year	battle	that	seemingly	caught	the	
world	 off-guard	 gave	 rise	 to	 innumerable	 analyses	 and	 critiques	 (Dubois	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Kamradt-Scott	
2016;	Panel	of	Independent	Experts	2015;	Moon	et	al.	2015;	National	Academy	of	Medicine	2016;	Ross	
et	 al.	 2017).	 These	 have	 in	 turn	 generated	 recommendations	 for	 the	 reform	 of	 national	 and	 global	
health	systems	to	ensure	that	a	tragedy	of	the	magnitude	of	the	West	African	Ebola	outbreak	will	never	
happen	 again.	 These	 point	 to	 failures	 at	 all	 levels:	 from	 systemic	 underfunding	 of	 the	 global	 health	
apparatus,	 slow	 resource	 mobilisation	 and	 inadequate	 leadership	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 WHO	 to	
disastrously	 ill-prepared	national	health	 sectors	and	 ineffective	engagement	of	affected	communities.	
The	 road	 from	 the	 first	 infection	 in	 Guinea’s	 forest	 region	 in	 December	 2013	 to	 the	 publication	 of	
compelling	explanations	of	what	went	wrong	after	thousands	lost	their	lives	was	not	an	easy	one.	It	is	
however	 a	 road	 worth	 retracting	 as	 it	 offers	 important	 insights	 into	 the	 circumstances	 and	
consequences	of	how	we	understand	crises	as	they	are	unfolding.	This	paper	explores	how	the	actors	
involved	 in	 the	 response	 to	 Ebola	produced	 knowledge	about	 the	epidemic,	 from	how	 it	 came	 to	be	
named	an	emergency	 to	 the	diagnosis	of	 its	 causes	and	 the	definition	of	 solutions.	As	 such,	 it	moves	
away	 from	 normative	 analyses	 of	 the	 response	 and	 focuses	 instead	 on	 its	 internal	 logic	 and	 its	
consequences	 for	 those	 affected.	 The	 epidemic	 presents	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 study	 the	 ways	 in	
which	 crisis	 narratives	 mould	 subjects,	 re-order	 social	 relations	 and	 create	 spaces	 for	 individuals	 to	
navigate	moments	of	great	uncertainty.		
	
Our	understanding	of	the	problems	that	confront	us	determines	how	we	decide	to	tackle	them.	Grint	
(2005,	 p.1468)	 argues	 that:	 ‘how	 we	 respond	 to	 a	 particular	 situation	 is	 not	 determined	 by	 that	
situation’,	but	by	how	we	interpret	the	context	in	which	it	happens.	Interventions	are	the	outcomes	of	
problematisation—a	process	that	requires	identifying	a	problem,	determining	its	causes	and	delineating	
targeted	solutions.	Problematisation	is	never	neutral	and	the	political	consequences	of	epistemic	claims	
have	long	been	the	focus	of	social	theory.	The	work	of	Michel	Foucault	has	been	uniquely	influential	in	
this	context,	providing	the	tools	for	analysing	the	implications	of	knowledge	production.	Foucault	made	
it	his	objective	to	study	‘the	different	modes	by	which,	in	our	culture,	human	beings	are	made	subjects’	
(cited	 in	Rabinow	1991,	p.7).	 These	modes	 included	 for	 example	 the	 ‘dividing	practices’	 embodied	 in	
‘modes	of	manipulation	that	combine	the	mediation	of	science	and	the	practice	of	exclusion’,	such	as	
internment	 of	 people	 in	 mental	 asylums,	 or	 the	 production	 of	 subjects	 through	 the	 ‘scientific	
classifications’	 generated,	 for	 example,	 by	 national	 statistics	 (Rabinow,	 1991,	 p.	 8).	 The	 making	 of	
subjects	 was	 not	 solely	 a	 passive	 process	 of	 creation	 and	 disciplining	 through	 scientific	 knowledge.	
Individuals	could	also	 turn	 themselves	 into	subjects	 through	what	he	called	 ‘technologies	of	 the	self’.	
Having	studied	the	‘technology	of	domination	and	power’,	this	focus	on	active	self-formations	allowed	
Foucault	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 individuals	 internalise	 dominant	 discourses	 and	 discipline	
themselves	accordingly.	These	 intersections	between	knowledge	and	power,	 then,	give	 rise	 to	 ‘docile	
[bodies]	that	may	be	subjected,	used,	transformed	and	improved’	(Foucault,	1988).	
	
Anthropologists	 of	 international	 development	 have	 taken	 Foucault’s	work	 seriously,	 applying	 it	 to	 an	
analysis	of	how	knowledge	about	the	developing	world,	the	definition	of	problems	and	the	delineation	
of	expertise	within	development	programming	have	configured	relations	and	moulded	subjects	(Arce	&	
Long,	2000;	Escobar,	2011;	Ferguson,	1994;	 Li,	2007).	These	analyses	have	 sought	 to	 look	behind	 the	
normative	propositions	of	development	projects	to	reveal	their	underlying	assumptions	and	their,	often	
unintended,	 consequences.	 Li's	 (2007)	 compelling	 work	 on	 conservation	 projects	 in	 Indonesia,	 for	
example,	reflects	on	how	interventions	intended	to	‘optimize	the	lives	of	others’	require	firstly	defining	
problems,	 or	 ‘deficiencies	 to	 be	 rectified’.	 Rendering	 these	 deficiencies	 intelligible,	 through	 data	 and	
theories	 of	 change	 as	 well	 as	 selective	 omissions,	makes	 it	 possible	 to	 posit	 technical	 interventions.	
Projects	of	 improvement	are	the	result	of	such	problematisations.	As	Ferguson	(1994)	puts	forward	in	
his	 Anti-Politics	 Machine,	 in	 making	 development	 problems	 technical	 and	 solvable	 through	 the	
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mobilisation	 of	 expert	 knowledge,	 the	 development	 industry	 depoliticises	 its	 interventions.	 This	
depoliticisation	serves	to	conceal	that	interventions	reconfigure	power	relations	in	practice,	not	least	by	
creating	 a	 separation	between	 ‘experts’	who	diagnose	problems	and	 ‘beneficiaries’	whose	 lives	need	
improvement.	Shifting	from	interpretations	of	development	as	the	product	of	hidden	agendas	and	the	
machinations	 of	 powerful	 interests,	 anthropologists	 like	 Li	 and	 Ferguson	 suggest	 that	 we	 take	 the	
progressive	aims	of	the	development	industry	at	their	word.	They	ask	us	to	redirect	our	analytic	gaze	to	
what	these	framings	produce,	what	identities,	relations	and	interactions	they	make	possible	and	which	
they	instead	foreclose.	
	
Moments	 of	 crisis	 amplify	 these	 processes	 of	 problematisation	 and	 their	 implications.	 The	 notion	 of	
crisis	is	ubiquitous	in	public	discourse	in	the	21st	century:	from	the	threat	of	terrorism	to	the	menace	of	
financial	 collapse	and	environmental	devastation.	 The	 triumphant	 tones	of	 Fukuyama's	 (1992)	End	of	
History	 as	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 collapsed,	 have	 given	 way	 to	 far	 gloomier	 perceptions	 of	 reality	 as	
persistently	unstable.	 In	her	book,	Anti-Crisis,	Roitman	(2013)	 invites	us	 to	take	a	step	back	and	think	
about	the	epistemological	claims	that	we	make	as	we	state	that	‘this	is	crisis’.	These	claims,	she	argues,	
engender	 certain	 types	 of	 action	 whilst	 making	 others	 impossible.	 The	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 that	 is	
produced	 about	 crisis,	much	 like	 the	 problematisations	 identified	 by	 Foucault	 and	 anthropologists	 of	
international	development,	directs	action	and	produces	subjects.	Agamben's	(2005)	notion	of	a	‘state	of	
exception’,	 developed	 through	 his	 analysis	 of	 post-	 9/11	 America,	 for	 example	 shows	 how	 ‘law	
encompasses	 living	 beings	 by	 means	 of	 its	 own	 suspension’	 as	 different	 forms	 of	 life	 come	 into	
existence	 through	 appeals	 to	 extraordinary	 circumstances.	 The	 imagery	 of	 crisis	 thus	 creates	 both	
subjects	of	intervention	and	agents	of	instability.		
	
Duffield's	 (2007)	analysis	of	 the	securitisation	of	development	elaborates	 this	 insight	by	showing	how	
donors	 justify	 poverty	 eradication	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 through	 appeals	 to	 security	 and	 the	 threat	 of	
violence.	 Securitisation	 was	 coined	 by	 scholars	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 school	 to	 describe	 the	 process	
whereby	 a	 referent	 object	 is	 made	 into	 a	 security	 threat,	 often	 in	 order	 to	 compete	 for	 visibility	 in	
policy-making	arenas	(Buzan	et	al	1998).	Duffield	(2007)	shows	how	this	process	applies	to	the	‘circular	
complementarity’	that	policy-makers	posit	between	security	and	development.	The	‘truth	of	our	time’,	
he	 argues,	 is	 that	 development	 and	 security	 are	 inextricably	 interlinked,	 as	 underdevelopment	 is	
understood	 to	 pose	 a	 risk	 within	 countries	 in	 the	 Global	 South	 and	 externally	 in	 the	 Global	 North,	
through	migration	flows,	terrorism	and	the	spread	of	disease.	Development	is	then	essential	to	achieve	
security.	This	nexus	relies	on	the	identification	of	‘surplus	populations’,	that	is,	‘conditions	of	existence	
that,	 but	 for	 the	 changes,	 adaptations	 and	 opportunities	 that	 progress	 demands	 or	 presents,	 would	
otherwise	 remain	 effectively	 useless,	 irrelevant	 or	 dangerous.’	 Intervention	 is	 rendered	 necessary	 to	
contain	these	populations,	to	improve	or	correct,	and	align	‘surplus	populations’	to	normative	modes	of	
existence.	 Surplus	 life,	 and	 the	 states	 of	 exception	 it	 engenders	 through	 its	 destabilising	 potential,	
means	that	interventions	rest	on	the	ability	to	determine	what	or	who	is	a	threat.		
	
This	paper	investigates	these	dynamics	in	the	context	of	the	Ebola	crisis,	focusing	on	how	the	framing	of	
the	 disease	 as	 a	 security	 problem	 influenced	 the	 way	 it	 was	 contained.	 Methodologically,	 the	 paper	
draws	 on	 ethnographic	 material	 collected	 during	 and	 after	 the	 crisis	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 in	 the	 capital,	
Freetown	 and	 in	 Kambia,	 a	 town	 on	 the	 Northern	 border	 with	 Guinea	 between	 2015	 and	 2017.	 The	
ethnographic	material	 ranges	 from	observation	of	Ebola	 response	meetings	 to	 interviews	and	 informal	
discussions	with	response	workers,	military	officers,	community	activists,	traditional	healers	and	ordinary	
citizens	 affected	 by	 the	 outbreak.	 These	 are	 complemented	 with	 reviews	 of	 policy	 briefs,	 press	
statements,	newspaper	articles,	operational	documents	and	programme	evaluations.	The	paper	outlines	
how	ways	of	understanding	the	crisis,	manifest	through	language	and	practices,	had	a	profound	impact	
on	 the	design	of	 interventions	 and	 for	 the	 experiences	 of	 affected	populations.	 In	 particular,	 it	 shows	
how	 a	 security	 approach	 collided	with	 community	 engagement	 efforts	 that	 focused	 on	 local	 practices	
and	beliefs	to	create	normative	accounts	of	individual	responsibility	and	citizenship	practices	in	times	of	
crisis.				
	
Whilst	 Foucauldian	 approaches	 help	 us	 understand	 the	productive	 power	of	 knowledge	 in	 a	 crisis	 like	
that	wrought	by	Ebola,	it	is	dangerous	to	reify	discourse	as	‘totalising	and	seamless’	(Li,	2007,	p.	25).	To	
avoid	this,	we	must	make	space	for	the	possibility	of	contestations,	 inconsistencies	and	resistance	that	
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rely	on	 taking	 the	agency	of	 actors	 at	 all	 levels	of	 the	 response	assemblage	 seriously.	 This	 is	done	 for	
example	by	showing	that	the	knowledge	produced	about	crisis	during	crisis	 is	contested	and	uncertain,	
the	 outcome	 of	 fierce	 negotiations	 amongst	 a	 multitude	 of	 people	 facing	 the	 most	 challenging	 of	
circumstances.	It	is	the	product	of	purposive	attempts	to	find	interpretations	that	would	catalyse	action,	
often	 with	 recognition	 of	 the	 indeterminacy	 of	 outcomes.	 Rather	 than	 imagining	 that	 ‘the	 relentless	
micro-physics	of	power	occur	beyond	the	 intelligence	of	 the	actors;	although	not	 that	of	 the	decoding	
anthropologist’,	we	 can	 focus	 instead	 on	 the	 complex	 efforts	 of	 a	 plethora	 of	 actors	 in	maintaining	 a	
sustainable	‘interpretive	community’	necessary	to	motivate	collective	action	(Mosse	2004,	p.644).	This	is	
not	incompatible	with	an	assessment	of	how	the	interpretations	of	crisis	and	the	nature	of	intervention	
re-order	political	relations	and	create	subjectivities	in	sometimes	unforeseeable	ways.	Indeed	as	we	shall	
see,	during	the	Ebola	crisis,	it	was	precisely	through	the	frictions	between	interpretations	and	the	cracks	
in	the	overarching	narratives	that	specific	crisis	subjects	emerged.	Secondly,	and	even	more	importantly,	
seeing	how	subjects	are	produced	by	 interpretations	of	 crisis	does	not	mean	positing	 them	as	passive	
recipients	 of	 powerful	 discourses.	 Ethnographic	 accounts	 can	 help	 us	 understand	 how	 ‘managed	
populations	work	with	strategies	of	control’	(Das	&	Poole,	2009,	p.	27)	and	to	identify	amidst	the	haze	of	
discourse,	the	tangible	ways	in	which	subjects	resist,	appropriate	and	manipulate	the	stories	that	frame	
them.		
	
The	 Ebola	 epidemic	 therefore	 offers	 a	 fascinating	 case	 study	 from	 which	 to	 consider	 the	 politics	 of	
knowledge	in	humanitarian	settings.	In	particular,	because	the	notion	of	‘resistance’	was	so	prominent	in	
interpretations	of	barriers	to	ending	the	disease,	the	outbreak	lends	itself	to	a	reconceptualization	of	the	
agency	of	those	at	the	receiving	end	of	policy	discourses.	Considering	how	moments	of	crisis	create	not	
only	subjectivities	but	also	opportunities	for	 individuals	to	reposition	themselves	strategically	allows	us	
to	 move	 beyond	 an	 unhelpful	 dichotomy,	 embraced	 by	 theorists	 and	 practitioners	 alike,	 between	
subjects	of	 intervention	as	either	adapting	or	resisting.	The	paper	begins	by	tracing	how	Ebola	came	to	
be	defined	as	crisis	and	how	the	crisis	was	then	securitised	at	both	 international	and	national	 levels.	 It	
then	reflects	on	how	these	interpretations	were	enacted	by	the	Ebola	response	assemblage	through	the	
combination	of	containment	measures	and	community	engagement	strategies	and	how	the	tensions	and	
synergies	between	 these	 two	approaches	produced	a	dichotomy	between	 those	willing	 to	comply	and	
those	who	needed	to	be	contained.	The	paper	then	concludes	with	the	story	of	Pa	Yamba,	a	traditional	
healer	from	Kambia,	to	show	how	he	used	the	language	of	crisis	to	reposition	himself	from	a	potentially	
dangerous	subject	to	becoming	a	knowledge	broker	in	a	time	of	epistemic	and	material	uncertainty.		
	
2 State	of	Emergency:	Naming	the	Crisis	
Chronologies	of	the	West	African	Ebola	outbreak	begin	with	Patient	Zero,	Emile	Ouamouno,	a	young	boy	
thought	 to	 have	 become	 infected	 after	 playing	 with	 a	 dead	 bat	 in	 the	 Guinean	 village	 of	 Meliandou	
(Leach,	 2015).	 But	 that	 is	 not	when	 the	 epidemic	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 a	 crisis.	 In	 order	 to	 trace	 the	
origins	of	attempts	to	contain	the	disease	in	Sierra	Leone,	we	must	first	pay	attention	to	the	processes	
involved	in	naming	the	crisis.		
	
The	trajectory	towards	the	definition	of	Ebola	as	an	emergency	was	fraught,	and	has	been	at	the	centre	
of	 critiques	 of	 the	 global	 response	 to	 the	 epidemic.	Médecins	 Sans	 Frontières	 (MSF)	were	 the	 first	 to	
sound	the	alarm	as	they	saw	cases	spreading	in	Guinea	and	beginning	to	cross	borders	in	the	region	in	
March	 2014	 (MSF,	 2015).	 Their	 claims	 that	 the	 outbreak	 was	 ‘unprecedented’	 were	 written	 off	 as	
alarmist	 and	 the	WHO	only	announced	a	PHEIC	on	 the	8th	August	2014,	after	1700	had	officially	been	
recorded	across	the	three	affected	countries.	The	WHO	has	been	criticised	for	its	delay,	most	vocally	by	
its	 own	 Interim	 Assessment	 Panel	 (2015).	 Critiques	 highlight	 several	 factors,	 including	 organisational	
problems,	recent	budget	cuts,	previous	criticisms	for	over-reaction	around	the	H1N1	influenza	pandemic,	
and	political	 sensitivities	 in	 the	 affected	 countries	 in	 explaining	why	 it	was	 so	difficult	 to	 arrive	 at	 the	
PHEIC	 announcement.	 Condemnations	 of	 the	 WHO’s	 delay	 point	 to	 the	 significance	 of	 having	 Ebola	
formally	 recognised	as	an	emergency,	as	without	 the	declaration	 it	was	difficult	 to	achieve	 the	 shared	
sense	of	urgency	necessary	to	mobilise	resources.	Once	the	PHEIC	was	declared	in	August,	a	number	of	
mechanisms	came	into	play	to	escalate	the	situation,	yet	uncertainty	remained	over	exactly	what	kind	of	
emergency	it	was	that	was	now	to	be	considered	‘of	international	concern’.	Such	uncertainty	was	visible	
in	 disagreements	 over	 whether	 the	 outbreak	 ought	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 humanitarian	 or	 a	 health	 crisis.	
	 7	
Ultimately,	for	various	reasons,	including	a	willingness	to	preserve	WHO	leadership	in	the	region,	the	UN	
system	 decided	 to	maintain	 a	 health	 focus	 rather	 than	 triggering	 a	 humanitarian	 apparatus,	 with	 the	
consequence	that	‘the	surge	capacity,	emergency	funding	and	coordination	structures	typical	of	a	large	
scale	disaster	response	were	not	triggered’	(Dubois	et	al.,	2015,	p.	v).	
	
Whilst	maintaining	a	health	focus	organisationally,	the	crisis	reached	the	Security	Council	 in	September	
2014,	with	a	statement	declaring	Ebola	a	‘threat	to	international	peace	and	security’	(UN,	2014):	
	
‘Recognizing	 that	 peacebuilding	 and	 development	 gains	 of	 the	 most	 affected	 countries	
concerned	could	be	reversed	in	light	of	the	Ebola	outbreak	and	underlining	that	the	outbreak	is	
undermining	the	stability	of	the	most	affected	countries	concerned	and,	unless	contained,	may	
lead	to	further	 instances	of	civil	unrest,	social	tensions	and	a	deterioration	of	the	political	and	
security	climate’.	
	
By	September	2014,	 therefore,	 the	epidemic	had	been	securitised.	The	 increasing	 securitisation	of	 the	
global	 health	 agenda	 has	 been	 widely	 documented	 (Abraham	 2011;	 Chigudu	 2016;	 Davies	 2008;	
Heymann	2003;	Benton	&	Dionne	2015).	As	definitions	of	security	widen	to	include	an	increasing	number	
of	phenomena,	it	becomes	possible	to	make	causal	links,	such	as	those	shown	in	the	2014	UN	resolution,	
which,	 in	 a	 single	 sentence	 reinterprets	 the	 consequences	 of	 disease	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 instability.	
These	 are	 not	 coincidental	 discursive	 turns,	 but	 effective	mechanisms	 for	 increasing	 urgency	 in	 policy	
fields	 where	 national	 security	 commands	 highest	 priority	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 highest	 budgets.	
Bernard	 (2013)	makes	 this	 explicit	 as	 he	 calls	 for	 defining	 global	 health	 challenges	 as	 security	 issues,	
based	on	his	 experience	 as	 Special	 Advisor	 to	 the	White	House	 Security	 Council	 and	 as	 former	 Senior	
Political	Advisor	to	the	WHO	Director	General.	Tracing	the	origins	of	attempts	to	get	HIV/AIDS	recognised	
as	a	security	concern	under	the	Clinton	administration,	he	exhorts	 the	health	community,	 if	 they	want	
their	concerns	to	be	taken	seriously	to	‘temper	its	tribal	conviction	and	convince	powerful	defence	and	
foreign	 affairs	 communities	 to	 embrace	 relevant	 health	 issues	 in	 the	 first	 tier	 of	 policy	 and	 budget	
concerns’	(Bernard,	2013,	p.	162).		
	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 Ebola,	 the	Commission	of	 a	Global	Health	Risk	 Framework,	 called	 for	 an	
institutionalised	 recognition	 of	 global	 health	 as	 a	 ‘neglected	 dimension	 of	 global	 security’.	 The	
Commission	recommends	for	an	increase	in	global	health	spending	of	$4.5	billion	a	year	and	asserts	that:	
‘framed	as	a	risk	to	human	security,	this	is	a	compelling	investment.’	Making	health	concerns	into	threats	
to	 national	 and	 global	 security,	 the	Commissioners	 acknowledge,	 increases	 the	 stakes	 of	 complacency	
and	facilitates	international	resource	mobilisation.	Appealing	to	the	imagery	of	security	can	help	make	a	
problem	in	the	‘remote	jungles’	of	West	Africa	a	matter	of	 international	concern.	Such	argumentations	
show	how	the	UN’s	declaration	of	Ebola	a	 ‘threat	 to	 international	peace	and	security’	 resulted	 from	a	
longer	trajectory	of	securitisation	of	health	priorities.		
	
These	narratives	of	crisis	had	implications	for	the	kind	of	response	that	was	mounted.	The	UN	set	up	its	
first	 ever	 peacekeeping-style	 health	 mission	 (UNMEER).	 Alongside	 a	 large	 complex	 of	 actors	 from	 all	
corners	 of	 the	 development,	 global	 health	 and	 humanitarian	 fields,	 the	 securitisation	 of	 the	 epidemic	
also	 ushered	 in	 a	 military	 response	 (Benton,	 2017).	 In	 a	 speech	 justifying	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 US	
military	command	centre	in	Liberia	ad	the	elevation	of	the	epidemic	to	a	national	security	priority,	then-
President	Barack	Obama	(2014)	expressed	the	security	dimensions	of	Ebola	explicitly:	
	
If	 the	outbreak	 is	not	 stopped	now,	we	could	be	 looking	at	hundreds	of	 thousands	of	people	
infected	with	profound	political,	economic	and	security	 implications	 for	all	of	us.	So	 this	 is	an	
epidemic	that	is	not	just	a	threat	to	regional	security,	it’s	a	potential	threat	to	global	security.	If	
these	countries	break	down,	if	their	economies	break	down,	if	people	panic,	that	has	profound	
effects	on	all	of	us,	even	if	we	are	not	directly	contracting	the	disease.	
	
Military	deployments	can	be	‘seductive	ideas’	not	least	because	the	‘politics	of	public	finance’	can	make	
them	the	only	tool	with	the	wherewithal	to	deal	with	the	exigencies	of	critical	situations	(De	Waal	2014,	
p.1).	 Concerns	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 militarization	 tend	 to	 be	 countered	 by	 delinking	 military	
apparatuses	 from	military	 logics	 and	 the	 Ebola	outbreak	was	no	exception	 (Benton	2017).	As	 a	 senior	
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British	officer	deployed	 in	Sierra	Leone	argued,	 the	military	were	presented	as	a	necessary	antidote	to	
challenging	circumstances:		
	
‘[By	the	summer	of	2014]	the	 international	community	had	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	something	
quickly,	and	[one]	of	the	best	ways	to	do	that	is	to	deploy	the	military.	Deploy	the	military	and	
we	 will	 work	 out	 exactly	 what	 they	 are	 going	 to	 do	 almost	 afterwards.	 We	 could	 deploy	
helicopters	down	there	really	quickly,	we	could	deploy	manpower	really	quickly,	much	quicker	
than	DFID	can	do,	much	quicker	than	the	Foreign	Office	can	do,	much	quicker	than	many	of	the	
NGOs’.	[Interview	21.12.2016]	
	
The	logic	of	militarization	was	thus	deeply	intertwined	with	the	particular	narrative	of	emergency	that	was	
taking	 shape.	 This	way	of	 thinking	about	 the	 crisis	 and	 the	need	 to	 find	quick	 and	 robust	 solutions	was	
paralleled	and	facilitated	by	a	similar	response	by	the	government	of	Sierra	Leone.		
	
The	security	and	crisis	complex	is	not	new	to	Sierra	Leone,	as	since	its	eleven	year	civil	war,	it	has	become	
emblematic	 of	 the	 increasing	 depiction	 of	 underdevelopment	 as	 a	 security	 concern,	 with	 structural	
fragilities	used	to	explain	cyclical	crisis	 (Enria,	2012,	2015).	As	the	disease	broke	out,	appeals	 to	security	
were	transposed	to	dealing	with	a	new	crisis.	The	President	declared	a	state	of	emergency	on	the	30th	of	
July	2014,	arguing	 that	 ‘extraordinary	 circumstances	 require	extraordinary	measures’	 and	calling	 for	 the	
establishment	of	quarantines	and	 limits	on	 freedom	of	movement	amongst	other	measures	 intended	to	
win	the	‘great	fight’	facing	the	country.	Like	the	international	response,	the	picture	of	crisis	painted	in	the	
President’s	speech	resulted	from	epistemic	struggles	amongst	key	players	in	the	months	between	the	first	
official	case	and	the	declaration	of	the	state	of	emergency.	According	to	the	accounts	of	those	involved	in	
initial	discussions,	there	were	tensions	between	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	Sanitation	(MoHS)	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 the	 Office	 of	 National	 Security	 (ONS)	 and	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 (MoD)	 on	 the	 other.	 The	
responsibility	had	 initially	 lay	with	the	MoHS	through	 its	Emergency	Operations	Centre	(EOC)	as	the	first	
cases	were	recorded	 in	 the	Eastern	part	of	 the	country,	but	by	the	 fall	of	2014,	 it	had	been	shifted	to	a	
newly	established	National	Ebola	Response	Centre	(NERC).	The	NERC	was	led	by	then	Minister	of	Defence,	
Retired	 Major	 Paolo	 Conteh,	 with	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Armed	 Forces	 (RSLAF)	 taking	 a	 role	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 state	 of	 emergency	 measures.	 An	 ONS	 official	 involved	 in	 the	 initial	 discussions	
recounted	the	MoHS’	unwillingness	to	bring	in	the	National	Security	Council,	insisting	that	the	outbreak	be	
treated	 as	 a	 health	 issue	 and	 questioning	 the	 value	 of	 security	 personnel	 expertise.	 He	 described	 the	
ultimate	shift	in	responsibilities	as	follows:	
	
‘Only	 the	military	 has	 the	ways	 to	 do	 that,	 but	 doctors	wanted	 to	 control	 everything,	 they	
wanted	 total	 [control]	 of	 it.	 Initially,	 [they	 did]	 but	 when	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 started	 dying	 in	
droves,	 the	 international	community	was	not	 intervening,	we	realised	that	 [the	MoHS]	were	
not	going	to	be	able	to	control	 this	 thing	so	we	changed	 leadership	 in	MoHS	and	brought	 in	
the	 security	 [sector].	NERC	was	 to	be	a	hybrid	organisation	and	Paolo	Conteh	has	a	military	
background’.	[Interview	12.01.2017]	
	
Under	Paolo	Conteh’s	leadership,	then	the	NERC	was	established	to	coordinate	the	response	at	national	
level	 through	 nine	 pillars	 (case	management,	 communications,	 logistics,	 safe	 burials,	 surveillance,	 food	
security,	social	mobilisation	and	child	protection).	The	response	was	then	also	devolved	through	District	
Ebola	Response	Centres	(DERC)	with	deployed	RSLAF	officers	coordinating	the	devolved	pillars.		
	
Once	 the	 fact	 of	 crisis	 had	 been	 established,	 and	 its	 urgency	 bolstered	 by	 claims	 to	 national	 and	
international	 security,	 the	 intervention	of	 the	military	 and	 the	establishment	of	 containment	 strategies	
through	 the	 proclamation	 of	 a	 state	 of	 emergency	 were	 justified	 in	 terms	 of	 expediency.	 With	 the	
groundwork	 done,	 it	 was	 now	 up	 to	 this	 new	 response	 architecture	 to	 manage	 interventions	 on	 the	
ground.	This	relied	on	particular	understandings	of	the	dynamics	of	crisis	as	it	unfolded	and	in	particular	
on	how	the	logic	of	securitisation	collided	with	prominent	explanations	of	why	the	epidemic	had	become	
so	intractable.		
	
3	 Securitisation	and	Sensitisation:	Responding	to	the	Crisis	
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As	 the	 disease	 spread	 across	 the	 regions,	 response	workers	 pointed	 to	 chains	 of	 transmissions	 to	
highlight	 the	 factors	 that	 stood	 in	 the	 way	 of	 defeating	 Ebola.	 Episodes	 of	 resistance	 to	 disease	
control	measures	 and	 those	 care	 practices	 such	 as	 caring	 for	 sick	 people	 and	 burial	 practices	 that	
involved	 the	 washing	 of	 the	 dead	 were	 especially	 prominent	 explanations.	 These	 explanations	
focused	on	how	lack	of	understanding	or	unwillingness	to	comply	with	public	health	regulations	was	
hindering	efforts	 to	end	Ebola.	Various	critics	have	pointed	to	 the	 fallacies	of	 these	 interpretations	
(Abramowitz,	Bardosh,	et	al.,	2015;	Abramowitz,	McLean,	et	al.,	2015;	Chandler	et	al.,	2015;	Jones,	
2011;	 Richards,	 2016;	 A.	 Wilkinson	 &	 Leach,	 2015;	 Annie	 Wilkinson,	 Parker,	 Martineau,	 &	 Leach,	
2017).	 Indeed,	 ‘behavioural	 and	 culturalist’	 interpretations	 that	 individualise,	 depoliticise	 and	 cast	
blame	 are	 not	 new	 to	 Ebola,	 and	 have	 been	 defined	 ‘as	 ineffective	 as	 they	 are	 unjust’	 in	 widely	
different	contexts	 (Fassin	2007,	p.xix).	The	effectiveness,	accuracy	or	 fairness	of	 these	narratives	 is	
however	not	the	main	subject	of	this	paper—the	focus	is	rather	on	the	internal	logic	of	the	behaviour	
change	argument	and	how	 it	 came	to	play	a	 role	 in	 the	security	approach	 to	disease	containment.	
Through	 points	 of	 conflict	 and	 convergence,	 sensitisation	 and	 containment	 approaches	 helped	 to	
create	a	particular,	if	fractured,	understanding	of	the	causes	of	crisis.		
	
Of	 seven	 challenges	 outlined	 in	 an	MoHS	 EVD	 Response	 Plan	 in	 July	 2014,	 for	 were:	 ‘inadequate	
understanding’;	 ‘denial,	mistrust	 and	 rejection’	 arising	 from	 ‘misinterpretation	 of	 the	 cause	 of	 the	
new	 disease’;	 ‘close	 community	 ties	 and	 movement’	 that	 made	 contact	 tracing	 difficult;	 and	
‘customary	burial	practices’	leading	to	‘panic	and	anxiety’	resulting	from	community	deaths.	The	rest	
were	 logistical	 challenges	 associated	with	 the	 capacity	 of	 healthcare	workers	 (including	 their	 own	
fears	of	the	disease)	and	geographical	spread	(MoHS,	2014).	Alongside	state	of	emergency	measures	
aimed	at	the	containment	of	at	risk	populations	through	quarantine,	restrictions	on	movements	and	
lockdowns,	 the	Ebola	 response	developed	an	organisational	pillar	 to	deal	with	 communication	and	
mobilisation	 in	 affected	 communities.	 The	 development	 of	 this	 ‘sensitisation	 approach’	 can	 be	
crudely	separated	 into	two	phases.	 In	a	 fist	phase,	 the	response	focused	primarily	on	public	health	
messaging.	During	this	time,	the	principle	underlying	much	of	the	communication	strategies	was	the	
need	to	change	‘risky	‘behaviour’	related	to	‘traditional’	practices	and	‘misinformation’’	(Chandler	et	
al.,	 2015,	 p.	 1275).	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 people	 needed	more	 biomedical	 knowledge	 so	 as	 to	
protect	 themselves	 from	 the	 disease.	 Billboards	 were	 put	 up	 insisting	 that	 ‘Ebola	 is	 real’	 and	
encouraging	people	to	report	sickness	to	a	national	helpline,	not	to	wash	dead	bodies,	not	to	touch	
others	and	to	stay	home	when	placed	in	quarantine.	In	these	framings,	cultural	beliefs	and	practices	
either	prevented	a	full	understanding	of	transmission	chains	or	actively	worked	against	the	need	to	
adapt	to	the	needs	of	the	crisis.	As	a	civil	society	leader	involved	in	the	coordination	of	NGOs	at	the	
NERC	 argued:	 ‘people	 needed	 to	 understand	 beyond	 their	 cultural	 perception’	 [Interview	
20.01.2017].		
	
In	a	 second	phase,	 the	 core	model	of	behaviour	 change	and	 sensitisation	 remained	 intact,	but	 the	
mode	 of	 delivery	 changed,	 as	 initial	 negative	 messaging	 such	 as:	 ‘Ebola	 kills’	 were	 found	 to	 be	
counterproductive.	A	redesign	of	the	sensitisation	model	to	focus	on	‘community	ownership’	was	in	
line	with	intimations	by	anthropologists	and	community	advocates	about	the	need	to	understand	the	
reasons	for	mistrust	and	explore	the	adaptive	potential	of	cultural	practices	rather	than	seeing	them	
as	static	hurdles.	In	their	July	2015	Getting	to	a	Resilient	Zero	strategy,	for	example,	the	NERC	(2015)	
located	 drivers	 of	 transmission	 in	 ‘fear,	 inadequate	 trust	 and	 collaboration	 from	 the	 communities’	
tendencies	to	seek	healthcare	through	informal	structures’	and	highlighted	the	need	to	‘understand	
community	behaviour’	and	streamline	ownership	by	enabling	communities	to	take	leadership	of	the	
response.		
	
The	problematisation	was	the	same	but	the	solution	was	more	sophisticated:	change	in	practices	had	
to	come	from	inside	affected	communities.	The	Social	Mobilisation	Action	Consortium	(SMAC)	(2014)	
for	example	developed	an	innovative	Community-Led	Ebola	Action	Field	Manual	to	train	community	
mobilisers,	with	 the	stated	aim	of	 ‘inspiring	communities	 to	understand	 the	urgency	and	 the	steps	
they	can	take	to	protect	 themselves	 from	Ebola’.	These	efforts,	 the	manual	states,	 ‘unlike	previous	
mobilisation	efforts,	which	have	mainly	used	health	education	and	one-way	communications…focus	
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on	 the	 community	 as	 a	whole	 and	 on	 the	 collective	 benefits	 of	 a	 cooperative	 and	 community-led	
approach.’	 Part	 of	 this	 process	was	 to	 ensure	 that	 communities	 committed	 to	 temporarily	 putting	
aside	knowledge	and	‘traditional’	practices	that	were	deemed	to	be	risky.	The	sensitisation	approach	
therefore	 had	 a	 specific	 theory	 of	 change	 aimed	 at	 changing	 risky	 behaviours,	 initially	 framed	 as	
misconceptions,	 later	 seen	 to	 require	 a	 deeper,	 more	 inclusive	 engagement	 with	 communities	 to	
encourage	them	to	address	barriers	to	necessary	behavioural	changes.	This	narrative	therefore	relied	
on	a	more	complex	understanding	of	local	practices	whilst	locating	both	the	cause	and	the	solution	
of	the	unfolding	crisis	within	communities.		
	
The	 sensitisation	 approach	 was	 not	 opposed	 to	 security	 perspectives.	 Indeed,	 the	 policies	 of	
containment	necessitated	by	the	security	approach	relied	on	the	same	interpretation	of	the	problem.	
An	ONS	 official	 described	 the	 response	 as	 requiring	 a	 ‘carrot	 and	 stick’	 approach:	 restrictions	 and	
punitive	 measures	 had	 to	 be	 in	 place	 for	 when	 community	 engagement	 (‘the	 carrot’)	 was	 not	
enough.	Security	personnel’s	justifications	for	containment	measures	were	similarly	premised	on	an	
acceptance	 of	 the	 community	 engagement	 model,	 but	 suggested	 that	 given	 the	 urgency	 of	
emergency,	contingency	plans	had	to	be	in	place	for	those	who	failed	to	collaborate.	A	RSLAF	officer	
speaking	 of	 his	 involvement	 in	 the	DERC	 In	 Kambia	 emphasised	 his	 understanding	 of	 reasons	 that	
may	drive	affected	 individuals	 to	defy	quarantines,	 such	as	 the	need	 to	 tend	 to	one’s	 farm.	At	 the	
same	time,	he	argued	that	unwillingness	to	comply	with	emergency	laws	was	a	persistent	threat	that	
needed	to	be	addressed:	
	
‘In	some	chiefdoms	that	I	don’t	want	to	name,	it	was	the	lawlessness	that	made	the	sickness	spread	
[…]	Why	do	you	think	they	involved	this	state	of	emergency?	If	they	had	just	relaxed	the	thing	would	
have	been	worse,	so	they	saw	that	the	best	thing	they	could	do	was	to	bring	in	the	security.	It	was	
not	violence	per	se,	but	just	for	people	to	comply	with	the	law	and	for	them	to	be	able	to	listen	to	
the	medical	advice’	[Interview	18.11.2015]	
	
This	 sentiment	 was	 shared	 beyond	military	 circles,	 including	 a	 civil	 society	 leader	 involved	 in	 the	
response	in	Kambia	who	reflected:	
	
‘When	the	president	announced	the	involvement	of	the	military	I	thought:	‘These	people	with	guns,	
how	could	they	fight	Ebola?	Something	that	they	cannot	see?’	But	when	after	sometime	they	came	
and	I	saw	the	rationale,	because	when	we	were	also	going	into	the	communities	some	people	when	
you	would	give	them	simple	instructions	to	follow	so	as	not	to	cause	problems	in	the	community	they	
would	not	want	to	follow	it.	If	we	had	not	had	the	law	enforcers	like	the	military	it	would	have	been	
difficult!’	[Interview	29.06.2016]	
	
This	is	not	to	say	that	there	were	not	fundamental	tensions	between	sets	of	actors	engaged	in	quite	
different	 sides	 of	 the	 response.	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 precisely	 through	 these	 tensions	 that	 crisis	
subjectivities	emerged,	as	we	shall	see.		
	
The	 balancing	 of	 community	 engagement	 efforts	 with	 containment	 policies	 rested	 on	 challenging	
ethical	questions	surrounding	how	to	weigh	the	rights	of	 individuals	against	those	of	the	collective.	
This	dilemma	for	example	played	out	in	an	altercation	in	a	Kambia	DERC	meeting	in	June	2015	after	
bylaws	had	been	announced	allowing	 the	 imposition	of	 fines	and	 jail	 sentences	 for	 those	 found	 in	
contravention	of	state	of	emergency	legislation.	As	a	group	of	people	was	to	appear	in	court	as	they	
had	been	caught	carrying	out	an	unsafe	burial	in	secret,	community	engagement	actors	made	a	case	
for	the	need	to	safeguard	citizens’	rights.	Others	however	retorted	that:	‘People	have	been	lying	to	
us,	there	is	a	background	of	deceit,	we	can’t	be	too	forgiving.’	This	response	worker’s	words,	thirteen	
months	after	 the	 first	cases,	 showed	the	growing	 impatience	 that	characterised	 the	 final	efforts	 to	
end	 the	 epidemic.	 These	 frustrations	 came	 to	 a	 head	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 Operation	Northern	
Push	 in	 Kambia,	 one	 of	 the	 two	 remaining	 hotspots	 of	 disease,	 together	 with	 Port	 Loko	 district,	
between	 June	 and	 July.	 The	 decision	 had	 come	 from	 increasing	 frustration	 at	 the	 higher	 level	 of	
government	and	a	willingness	to	‘take	political	risks	by	being	more	muscular’	[Interview	21.12.2016].	
The	 Operation	 was	 intended	 to	 intensify	 efforts	 to	 ‘identify,	 contain	 and	 eradicate	 EVD	 from	 the	
infected	areas	(NERC,	2015b).	This	would	require	‘intensive	community	engagement’	(DERC	2015)	as	
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well	as	a	‘significant	security	element’	to	support	the	implementation	of	new	regulations	including	a	
6am	to	6pm	curfew,	strengthened	checkpoints	and	 ‘strong	efforts	 to	 find,	 isolate	and	 track	people	
who	abscond	and	an	increase	in	community	surveillance,	enhanced	by	a	stricter	enforcement	of	the	
Safe	and	Dignified	Burial	bylaws’	(NERC,	2015b).		
	
4	 	Dangerous	Bodies	and	Ebola	Heroes:	Crisis	Subjectivities	
The	 productive	 tensions	 and	 conjunctures	 between	 the	 security	 and	 community	 engagement	
approaches	had	important	implications.	The	problematisation	of	crisis	as	it	unfolded	in	Sierra	Leone	
brought	together	engagement	and	containment	into	a	single	solution	necessitated	by	the	urgency	of	
the	emergency.	Change	had	to	happen	within	communities	driven	by	individuals	willing	to	commit	to	
changing	 their	 practices	 and	 of	 convincing	 their	 communities	 of	 doing	 the	 same.	 When	 these	
grassroots	 efforts	 failed,	 individuals	 refusing	 to	 comply	would	have	 to	be	 contained	 through	other	
measures.	 The	 political	 dimensions	 of	 crisis	 were	 muted	 as	 responsibility	 was	 individualised	 and	
containment	 measures	 depicted	 as	 a	 necessity	 borne	 by	 urgency.	 Yet,	 this	 problematisation	 was	
deeply	 political	 in	 practice,	 not	 least	 in	 the	 way	 it	 produced	 a	 dichotomy	 of	 subjects:	 the	 Ebola	
heroes,	 the	active	citizens	 that	accepted	biomedical	expertise	and	took	charge	of	 the	sensitisation,	
and	 those	 who	 were	 holding	 up	 progress	 and	 putting	 their	 society	 at	 risk.	 These	 subjectivities	
emanated	from	both	the	‘material	and	immaterial’	dimensions	of	disease	control	strategies,	through	
the	language,	spatial	practices	and	visual	artefacts	of	the	response	(Hoffman,	2016,	p.	247).	
	
In	their	Standard	Operating	Procedure	for	Social	Mobilisation	and	Community	Engagement,	the	NERC	
(2015c)	tells	prospective	mobilisers	that:	
	
‘To	stop	Ebola	transmission,	communities	and	individuals	themselves	must	make	changes	to	some	of	
their	 social	 and	 cultural	 practices.	 Social	 mobilisation	 and	 community	 engagement	 aims	 to	 help	
communities	and	individuals	to	understand	and	take	ownership	of	their	situation’	
	
In	 the	 CLEA	 Field	 Manual	 such	 ownership	 of	 behaviour	 change	 was	 to	 be	 led	 by	 ‘community	
champions’,	who	were	‘critical	to	success,	because	they	have	the	commitment	and	energy	to	follow	
up	with	their	neighbours	and	to	encourage	changes	in	community	norms	and	implementation	of	the	
agreed	action	plan’.	Community	champions	were	to	carry	their	communities	to	what	the	Manual	calls	
an	 ‘ignition	moment’,	 that	 is,	 the	 ‘collective	 realisation	 that	 due	 to	 community	 practices	 (of	 good,	
caring	people)	community	members	are	currently	at	serious	risk	of	catching	Ebola’.	The	notion	that	
communities,	 led	by	active	and	concerned	 individuals	are	central	 to	 the	response	was	 furthermore	
underlined	 by	 the	 ubiquitous	 billboards	 asserting	 that	 ‘You	 can	 help	 to	 Stop	 Ebola’	 and	 posters	
shipped	across	the	country	picturing	doctors,	contact	tracers,	survivors	and	police	officers	as	‘Ebola	
Heroes’.	 These	 narratives	 of	 community	 ownership	 and	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 the	 common	
good	were	undoubtedly	reductive.	‘Ebola	heroes’	such	as	nurses	and	volunteers	were	rarely	paid	and	
suffered	 significant	 stigma	 and	mental	 health	 repercussions	 (Kingori	 &	Mcgowan,	 2016).	 Similarly,	
community	 engagement	 language	 romanticise	 communities,	 evading	 the	 realities	 of	 power	 and	
hierarchies	and	the	impact	these	would	have	on	the	implementation	of	engagement	practices	(Enria	
et	 al.,	 2016;	 Annie	 Wilkinson	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 However,	 as	 has	 been	 recognised	 by	 scholars	 of	
development	discourse,	 it	 is	often	precisely	through	such	simplifications	that	it	 is	possible	to	create	
powerful	mobilising	 narratives	 (Mosse,	 2004).	 As	 such,	 politics	 and	 the	 challenges	 of	mistrust	 and	
community	tensions	had	to	be	put	aside	in	order	to	elicit	action.		
	
The	figure	of	the	Ebola	hero	was	premised	on	its	opposite:	the	dangerous	bodies	of	the	sick,	the	dead	
and,	most	 importantly,	 those	 at	 risk	 of	 contracting	 and	 transmitting	 the	 disease.	 These	 came	 into	
being	 through	 ‘dividing	 practices’	 such	 as	 body	 bags,	 Personal	 Protective	 Equipment	 (PPE),	
quarantines	 and	 triage	 points.	 They	 also	 emerged	 through	 the	 language	 used	 to	 describe	 the	
response	 such	 as	 the	 war	 imagery	 and	 combat	 metaphors	 that	 were	 rife	 in	 response	 operation	
meetings.	Ebola,	was	to	be	treated	like	a	war,	and	the	‘invisible	enemy’	had	to	be	defeated	by	finding	
and	containing	people	who	were	a	risk	to	themselves	and	others.	In	September	2015,	for	example,	a	
reward	was	 announced	 for	 finding	 a	missing	 contact,	with	 response	 officials	 emphasising	 that	 her	
dangerous	behaviour	might	be	due	to	a	lack	of	understanding	and	therefore,	whilst	not	intending	to	
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treat	her	like	a	criminal,	she	needed	to	be	found:	
	
The	 National	 Ebola	 Response	 Centre	 (NERC)	 has	 announced	 a	 five	 million	 Leones	 reward	 for	 the	
arrest	or	information	leading	to	the	whereabouts	of	32-year	old	Kadiatu	Sinneh	Kamara	believed	to	
be	an	Ebola	high-risk	contact.	Kadiatu	who	is	‘not	a	criminal’	according	to	the	CEO,	Palo	Conteh	has	
been	out	of	the	radar	of	Contact	Tracers	for	the	past	20	day	‘[...]	It	is	also	possible	that	she	does	not	
understand	how	vital	she	is	to	the	response’,	the	CEO	maintains.’	(Awoko,	25	September	2015)	
	
Visual	representations	of	epidemiological	chains	of	transmissions	were	equally	powerful	in	terms	of	
the	stories	they	told	about	risky	behaviour	and	dangerous	individuals.	In	August	2015,	as	Kambia	was	
just	a	day	away	 from	being	declared	Ebola	 free,	 the	Kambia	DERC	called	a	meeting	 to	announce	a	
new	case.	The	military	officer	in	charged	opened	the	meeting	announcing	that	the	district	had	been	
‘invaded’	and	‘attacked’	once	more.	The	end	of	the	epidemic,	as	cases	became	few	and	far	between,	
showed	 very	 clearly	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 crisis	were	 individualised	 as	 specific	 cases	
were	discussed	at	length.	The	particular	case	that	had	‘invaded’	Kambia	as	the	district	was	hoping	to	
conclude	 its	observation	period,	related	to	the	death	of	an	old	woman	who	was	rumoured	to	have	
had	a	secret	affair	with	an	Ebola	survivor.	In	the	midst	of	uncertainty	surrounding	the	possibility	for	
sexual	 transmission	 by	 survivors,	 epidemiological	 chains	 depicted	 connections	 between	 cases	 and	
told	individual	stories	of	traditional	medicine,	unsafe	burials	and	unprotected	sex.		
	
Problematisations	 of	 the	 crisis	 and	 the	 practical	 solutions	 they	 made	 possible	 thus	 relied	 on	 the	
production	of	subjectivities	to	be	acted	upon	and	the	separation	of	active	citizens	from	recalcitrant	
ones.	Yet	these	narratives	were	not	uncontested.	Not	only	did	they	spark	debates	and	confrontations	
within	 the	 response,	 but	 they	 also	 created	 spaces	 for	 the	 subjects	 of	 discursive	 constructions	 to	
respond.					
	
5	 Pa	Yamba:	(Re)Positioning	
Pa	 Yamba	was	 a	 powerful	 herbalist	 from	Tonko	 Limba	 chiefdom,	 an	 area	 renowned	 for	 producing	
formidable	healers.	His	age	and	wisdom	made	him	the	keeper	of	the	trade’s	history	in	Kambia,	where	
he	now	 lived,	with	prospective	apprentices	always	welcome	 in	his	 crowded	house.	As	Ebola	broke	
out,	 traditional	 healing	was	 banned,	 as	 the	 ‘rubbing’	 of	medicine	 on	 patients’	 bodies	was	 a	major	
conduit	 of	 disease.	Many	 healers	 felt	 aggrieved	 as	 they	were	 put	 out	 of	work.	 Some	 continued	 in	
secret,	risking	fines	or	even	their	lives	as	they	were	exposed	to	the	virus.	At	the	end	of	the	outbreak,	
as	we	sat	on	his	veranda,	Pa	Yamba	reflected	on	his	own	decision	to	become	actively	involved	in	the	
response.	 In	 the	early	months	of	 the	state	of	 the	emergency	he	volunteered	 for	a	 job	nobody	else	
wanted	to	do:	he	joined	the	burial	team.	The	new	regulations	prohibiting	the	washing	and	dressing	of	
dead	bodies	and	the	use	of	body	bags	by	PPE-clad	burial	teams	caused	significant	tensions	between	
the	Ebola	response	teams	and	the	communities	in	which	they	intervened.	The	bodies	of	Ebola	victims	
also	carried	the	highest	viral	load,	making	the	burial	team’s	risky	task	unpalatable	for	the	majority.	Pa	
Yamba	however	argued	that	this	way	he	could	continue	feeding	his	 family	whilst	he	was	unable	to	
practice	his	trade.	Indeed,	in	our	conversations	Pa	Yamba	emphasised	his	refusal	to	accept	patients	
throughout	 the	 outbreak,	 theatrically	 demonstrating	 how	 he	 would	 turn	 people	 away	 and	 report	
them	to	the	police	in	secret.		
	
One	 incident	 he	 recounted	 stood	 out	 as	 especially	 symbolic	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 people	 like	 Pa	
Yamba	 sought	 to	 navigate	 the	 crisis,	 to	 re-position	 themselves	 strategically,	 remoulding	 their	
identities	through	the	dominant	narratives	of	the	response.	The	story	began	with	Pa	Yamba	and	his	
team	being	called	out	to	a	village	 in	a	different	chiefdom.	As	they	arrived	 in	their	 response	vehicle	
and	approached	 the	house,	 they	met	 several	women	boiling	pots	of	water,	 preparing	 to	wash	 the	
bodies.	Pa	Yamba	gestured	to	his	team	to	keep	calm	and	proceed	slowly.	Making	no	mention	of	the	
water	being	prepared,	he	asked	one	of	the	women	to	show	him	to	the	room	where	the	deceased	lay.	
He	 asked	 one	 of	 his	 colleagues	 to	 discreetly	 jot	 down	 the	 names	 of	 the	 caregivers	 as	 the	woman	
enumerated	them.	As	he	 left	the	room	and	stepped	 into	a	backyard	he	met	a	huddle	of	men	who,	
believing	he	did	not	speak	Soso,	the	language	of	the	village,	made	arrangements	to	attack	him	and	
his	 team.	Pa	Yamba	 remained	calm	but	 signalled	 to	his	 colleague	 that	 it	was	 time	 to	 leave.	As	 the	
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men	produced	their	machetes,	 the	burial	 team	jumped	 in	the	car	and	departed	at	great	speed.	On	
their	way	out,	military	officers	on	their	motorbikes	stopped	the	car,	asking	the	burial	team	why	they	
were	driving	so	fast.	After	they	had	recounted	their	story,	the	soldiers	told	them	to	turn	around:	they	
would	 escort	 them.	 As	 they	 arrived,	 Pa	 Yamba	 described	 how	 the	 soldiers	 forced	 the	 village	men	
onto	their	knees	by	hitting	them	with	the	butts	of	their	guns	whilst	the	burial	team	quickly	changed	
into	 their	 PPE	 and	 buried	 the	 body.	 Before	 leaving,	 Pa	 Yamba	 made	 the	 villagers	 hold	 out	 the	
kasanke,	the	Muslim	burial	cloth,	while	he	set	it	on	fire—half	procedure,	half	punishment.		
	
The	 point	 of	 this	 story	 is	 not	 to	 report	 malpractice	 amongst	 the	 Ebola	 response	 workers	 or	 to	
sensationalise	the	violence	that	was	part	of	both	disease	containment	and	resistance	to	it.	Rather,	it	
is	to	highlight	how	someone	like	Pa	Yamba	aimed	to	reposition	himself	from	the	danger	he	embodied	
as	a	 representative	of	 traditional	knowledge	 to	active	citizen,	enforcer	of	 the	 response.	During	 the	
outbreak	 there	was	a	 spectrum	of	 resistance	 to	 the	knowledge	produced	about	 the	crisis,	 through	
refusal	 to	 comply	with	 regulations,	 social	 commentary	of	 rumours	 and	 conspiracies,	 or	 the	 violent	
resistance	 signified	 by	 the	 villagers	 in	 Pa	 Yamba’s	 story.	 Yet,	 agency	 does	 not	 lie	 solely	 in	 overt	
resistance	 or	 rejection	 of	 dominant	 ways	 of	 knowing.	 Pa	 Yamba’s	 implication	 in	 the	 logic	 of	
securitisation	and	his	attempts	to	renegotiate	his	identity	offer	a	different	insight	into	how	crisis	and	
subjects	shape	each	other.		
	
As	traditional	practices	were	declared	a	barrier	to	disease	containment,	Pa	Yamba	identified	a	threat	
to	his	 livelihood	as	his	role	as	traditional	healer	placed	him	decisively	 in	the	category	of	potentially	
dangerous	citizens	 in	need	of	being	disciplined.	Pa	Yamba	embraced	the	 language	of	the	response,	
and	 talked	 about	how	his	 own	 ‘sensitisation’	 saved	his	 life	 in	 contrast	 to	 his	 colleagues	who	were	
unwilling	to	listen.	He	presented	himself	as	malleable	and	ready	to	change	his	behaviour,	in	contrast	
to	 the	 dangerous	 bodies	 in	 the	 Soso	 village.	 In	 his	 characterisation	 of	 the	 villagers	 as	 resistant	 to	
change	 and	 potentially	 violent,	 Pa	 Yamba	 justified	 their	 disciplining	 by	 the	 soldiers	 and	 the	
powerfully	symbolic	burning	of	the	kasanke	as	a	final	lesson	in	the	importance	of	collaboration.	His	
refashioning	 as	 an	 Ebola	 hero	 was	 not	 simply	 a	 case	 of	 embodying	 dominant	 discourse	 through	
actions	 and	 thoughts.	 It	 was	 strategic:	 it	 entailed	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 traditional	
knowledge	in	the	response	that	elevated	him	to	the	role	of	irreplaceable	broker.	He	argued	that	he	
was	 a	 uniquely	 positioned	 member	 of	 the	 burial	 team	 not	 despite	 his	 role	 as	 ‘society	 man’,	 but	
because	of	 it.	He	recalled	for	example	an	instance	where	Temne	members	of	the	burial	team	were	
sent	to	deal	with	the	burial	of	a	member	of	the	Limba	Gbangbani	society.	Burial	practices,	as	Richards	
(et	al.	2015)	have	stressed,	are	central	to	social	order	and	reproduction	in	Sierra	Leone,	so	that	the	
new	regulations	involving	plastic	body	bags	and	the	banning	of	body	washing	created	deep	anxieties.	
Society	members’	funerals,	furthermore,	are	‘secret	events—not	‘secret	burials’	in	the	sense	implied	
by	Ebola	responders,	but	closed	events	restricted	only	to	members	of	 the	sodality’	 (Richards	2016:	
101).	Pa	Yamba	argued	that	given	their	role	as	‘outsiders’,	the	team	that	was	sent	to	the	location	was	
bound	to	fail	in	gaining	the	trust	of	the	society	men	tasked	with	the	burial.	As	his	prediction	proved	
accurate,	Pa	Yamba	was	called	in.	He	was	able	to	negotiate	with	them	as	a	society	man	himself,	and	
convinced	 them	 to	 ‘play	 the	 society’	 in	 the	 forest	 as	 the	burial	 team	buried	 the	man	according	 to	
procedure.	 He	 described	 how	 the	 other	members	 of	 the	 team	became	 afraid	 during	 the	 burial	 as	
they	heard	the	society’s	performance	in	the	distance,	but	he	calmed	them	down	and	assured	them	
that	he	had	pacified	the	Gbangbani.	Whilst	accepting	the	premises	of	the	emergency	measures,	he	
critiqued	 the	 response	 in	 ways	 that	 made	 him	 and	 people	 like	 him	 essential	 to	 success.	 This	
simultaneously	required	actively	differentiating	himself	from	‘dangerous’	others	by	disciplining	them.	
As	 a	 society	 man	 he	 could	 at	 once	 be	 enforcer	 of	 dividing	 practices	 and	 a	 broker	 reframing	 the	
response	 according	 to	 his	 superior	 knowledge	 of	 his	 community.	 This	 form	 of	 strategic	 brokerage	
thus	shows	both	the	power	of	discursive	 framings	and	the	multiplicity	of	ways	 in	which	 individuals	
decide	to	engage	with	them	from	their	unique	standpoint.		
	
6	 Conclusion	
The	story	of	the	West	African	Ebola	outbreak	will	shape	how	future	epidemics	will	be	contained,	how	
national	 health	 systems	 rebuild	 and	 how	 the	 governments	 of	 the	 three	 most	 affected	 countries	
engage	 with	 their	 populations	 as	 they	 begin,	 yet	 again,	 their	 paths	 to	 recovery.	 Following	 the	
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processes	 through	which	 this	 story	developed,	 in	different	 spaces	and	as	a	product	of	 interactions	
between	very	different	kinds	of	actors,	showed	how	the	problematisation	of	Ebola	shaped	the	way	
the	epidemic	was	contained	with	significant	implications	for	affected	communities.	A	conjuncture	of	
narratives	 about	 crisis	 and	 its	 roots,	 driven	 by	 different	 framings,	 ranging	 from	 epidemiological	
understandings	of	contagion	to	the	logic	of	international	humanitarian	intervention	and	the	specific	
needs	of	the	Sierra	Leonean	state,	configured	a	particular	set	of	relations	and	subjectivities	during	a	
state	of	 exception.	 The	 coming	 together	of	 securitisation	and	 state	of	 emergency	 laws	on	 the	one	
hand	 and	 a	 growing	 concern	 for	 community	 engagement	 and	 behavioural	 change	 on	 the	 other,	
created	a	powerful	dichotomy	between	compliant	citizens,	the	Ebola	heroes,	and	dangerous	citizens	
in	 need	 of	 discipline	 and	 containment.	 As	 Pa	 Yamba’s	 story	 shows,	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 these	 new	
configurations	 of	 power,	 people	 on	 the	 margins	 engaged	 with,	 resisted	 and	 manipulated	 these	
practices	of	control.	The	logic	of	crisis	set	in	motion	strategic	repositionings	as	individuals	found	ways	
to	 survive	 in	 a	 new	 and	 fast-changing	 landscape.	 	 At	 a	 time	 of	 great	 uncertainty,	 in	 other	words,	
different	 types	 of	 logics	 collided	 to	 create	 a	 depoliticised	 plan	 for	 action	 with	 deeply	 political	
consequences.	Appeals	to	security	and	emergency	declarations	facilitated	the	framing	of	militarised	
containment	practices	as	expedient	complements	to	community	engagement	efforts.	This	resulted	in	
powerful	 dividing	 narratives	 about	 individual	 responsibility	 and	 the	 public	 good,	 which	 raise	
important	 questions	 about	 how	 citizens	 are	 positioned	 vis-à-vis	 the	 state	 in	 times	 of	 crisis.	 These	
discourses	and	the	practices	they	engender	also	had	profound	consequences	for	how	citizens	relate	
to	 each	 other,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 Pa	 Yamba’s	 memories	 from	 his	 meting	 out	 of	 punishment	 in	 the	
village	as	a	way	to	navigate	his	own	way	through	the	emergency.		
	
The	case	of	Ebola	thus	offers	a	unique	vantage	point	from	which	to	look	at	the	politics	of	knowledge	
in	crisis.	Analyses	of	crisis	have	emphasised	the	forms	of	control	 it	makes	possible,	or	the	states	of	
emergency	 it	 engenders.	 Studying	 how	 crisis	 produces	 subjects	 is	 crucial	 if	 we	 want	 to	 fully	
understand	 the	 consequences	 of	 emergency	 responses	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	 can	 redefine	
social	and	political	relations	beyond	the	formal	end	of	emergencies.	At	the	same	time,	this	paper	has	
also	 shown	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 how	 those	 who	 are	 targets	 of	 intervention	 respond.	
Studying	 this	 ethnographically	 highlights	 that	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 adaptation	 and	 resistance	
embraced	 by	 scholars	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 cannot	 capture	 the	 full	 spectrum	 of	 possibility	 that	
moments	of	 crisis	open	up.	As	 the	official	emergency	 in	Sierra	Leone	has	ended,	and	 life	has	gone	
‘back	to	normal’,	the	question	then	remains	as	to	what	the	relations	and	subjectivities	that	particular	
crisis	narratives	make	possible	mean	going	forward.	Vigh	(2008,	p.7)	has	argued,	that	for	a	large	part	
of	 the	world’s	population,	crisis	 is	 ‘endemic	rather	 than	episodic’.	That	 is	undoubtedly	 the	case	 for	
most	Sierra	Leoneans	like	Pa	Yamba,	who,	after	the	end	of	Ebola	will	continue	to	contend	with	daily	
struggles	to	make	ends	meet,	with	the	structural	and	physical	violence	of	poverty	and	the	unchanged	
realities	of	dilapidated	health	systems.	What	remains	to	be	seen	is	how	experiences	of	crisis,	and	the	
new	relations	and	identities	that	they	entailed,	will	come	to	define	visions	of	the	future.		
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